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Fracking Bans, Taxation, and  
Environmental Policy 
Robert D. Cheren† 
Abstract 
This Article investigates the tax bases of local jurisdictions that 
have imposed bans on horizontal slickwater fracturing, colloquially 
known as fracking. Local governments that draw little additional 
revenue from fracking are more likely to ban the practice because of 
environmental concerns. The correlation between the issuance of local 
fracking bans and the relative absence of additional local revenue 
from fracking indicates the importance of taxation in determining  
the proper balance between federal, state, and local governments in 
the process of making environmental policy. 
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† Associate, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Cleveland, Ohio. 
This theory of representative taxation presented for the first time here 
began as a side note in Tragic Parlor Pigs and Comedic Rascally Rabbits, 
63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 555, 573 (2012) (“The Crown’s primary 
interest, as residual beneficiary of all production, was to see production 
maximized in order to generate higher revenues.”); id. n.70 (“The 
Crown received income from production. If production increased, the 
Crown’s revenue increased. If production decreased, the Crown’s 
revenue decreased. It is therefore understandable that the policies of the 
Crown courts fell in line with the needs and desires of the Exchequer.”).  
The efforts of Professor Peter M. Gerhart, Professor Jonathan L. Entin, 
David Carper, and Mary Koch in the development of that work laid the 
foundation for this theory and so the Author again owes them dearly. 
Following the publication of Tragic Parlor Pigs, the Author developed 
this theory through extensive research into the history of taxation and 
English constitutional law carried out with the invaluable guidance, 
support, and good humor of Professor Erik M. Jensen. Finally, Professor 
Jonathan H. Adler provided the opportunity to prepare and publish this 
Article and offered important assistance along the way. 
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Introduction 
In November 1922, the Village Council of Euclid, Ohio, adopted 
an ordinance1 “establishing a comprehensive zoning plan.”2 Ambler 
Realty challenged the ordinance on the grounds that its restrictions 
and controls would “confiscate and destroy a great part of [the] value” 
of land falling within regions zoned for limited residential purposes.3 
The United States Supreme Court held the ordinance a valid exercise 
of the police power of the state delegated to local jurisdictions like 
Euclid to keep pigs out of the parlors but permit pigs in barnyards.4 
Local jurisdictions to this day limit certain land uses to certain areas.  
Further, just as in the Village of Euclid’s 1922 zoning ordinance, 
certain land uses are “prohibited altogether” by local jurisdictions.5 
Recently, numerous jurisdictions across the United States have made 
natural gas exploration and production a prohibited use as a result of 
environmental concerns over the practice of horizontal slickwater 
fracturing, colloquially known as fracking. These fracking bans cover 
thousands of square miles of land above gas laden shale formations. 
This is a whole ocean of natural gas no one can get at.6 
This is not an article on fracking technology or its environmental 
consequences. Rather, this Article uses the phenomena of local 
fracking bans to demonstrate an attribute of governmental entities 
relevant to the determination of the proper locus of environmental 
policymaking—taxation. This Article shows that local jurisdictions 
that draw no additional revenue from fracking are more likely to 
impose fracking bans and conversely local jurisdictions that draw 
additional revenue from fracking are less likely to do so.  
 
1. Village of Euclid, Ohio, Zoning Ordinance 2812 (Nov. 13, 1922).  
2. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926). 
3. Id. at 384. 
4. Id. at 388. 
5. Id. at 381. The Euclid ordinance banned ten categories of land use: “(1) 
Veterinary hospital. (2) Reduction of garbage, refuse, offal, or dead 
animals. (3) Explosives and fireworks, manufacture or storage. (4) 
Cement, lime, gypsum or plaster-of-paris manufacture. (5) Chlorine, or 
gydrochloric, nitric or picric acid manufacture. (6) Smelting of iron, 
copper, tin or zinc ores. (7) Distillation of bones, fat rendering, glue 
manufacture from raw materials, fertilizer manufacture. (8) Stockyards, 
slaughtering of animals. (9) Tanneries, oil refineries. (10) Storage of 
volatile oil or gasoline in excess of 25000 gallons.” Village of Euclid, 
Ohio, Zoning Ordinance 2812. A careful reading of that comprehensive 
zoning plan suggests fracking would have been permitted in industrial 
areas. 
6. There Will Be Blood (Paramount Vantage and Miramax Films 
2007) (“There is a whole ocean of oil under our feet. No one can get at 
it except for me.”). 
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Why the connection between fracking bans and taxation? When a 
potential land use will increase revenues, a local jurisdiction exercising 
its zoning power must either permit the use or forfeit the additional 
revenue. This Article posits that governmental entities tend to 
maximize their revenue. Accordingly, local jurisdictions will tend to 
permit revenue-generating uses. But whether any potential land use 
generates revenue for a local jurisdiction depends on the local 
jurisdiction’s financial characteristics. These financial characteristics 
vary significantly from state to state and, to a lesser degree, from 
locality to locality within each state. In order to predict whether a 
local jurisdiction is likely or unlikely to ban fracking, one need only 
follow the money generated from the use of fracking and see whether 
any significant portion falls into the hands of the local jurisdiction. 
I. Local Fracking Bans 
This investigation of local fracking bans requires detailed data on 
their incidence. To this end, Geographic Information System maps 
were obtained for the political subdivisions of states covered by three 
overlapping shale plays, the Devonian, Marcellus, and Utica, a region 
laden with shale formations ripe for fracking.7 These shale plays reach 
across New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Maryland, 
Kentucky, and Virginia.8 Of the political subdivisions that govern 
these territories, the vast majority have not banned fracking. In all, 
political subdivisions covering 4,400.07 out of a total of 120,129.38 
square miles have imposed a legislative fracking ban or moratorium. 
But these fracking bans and moratoria are almost entirely confined 
within New York and a small portion of Pennsylvania in and around 
Pittsburgh. Of the political subdivisions outside New York and this 
small portion of Pennsylvania, fracking bans and moratoria have 
touched only 21.24 square miles of the shale plays, less than half of 
one percent of the total area touched by legislative fracking bans in 
the shale plays. The concentration of 99.517% of fracking bans by 
area in the state of New York and the Pittsburgh metropolitan area 
represents a significant variance in legislative responses to fracking 
amongst political subdivisions in as opposed to outside these regions. 
 
7. Figures and statistics in this Article were prepared and calculated using 
the ArcGIS platform. Geographic Information System shale play maps 
were obtained from the United State Energy Information 
Administration and were last updated May 9, 2011, available at http: 
//www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/maps/
maps.htm. Political subdivision maps were obtained by the Case 
Western Reserve University Kelvin Smith Library staff. This Article is 
limited to the local bans imposed as of August 31, 2013. 
8. This Article is limited to these three shale plays, leaving out the Antrim 
shale play, which covers part of Ohio, and the New Albany shale play, 
which covers part of Kentucky.  
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Figure 1: Devonian, Marcellus, and Utica Fracking Bans 
 Shale Plays Ban Legislative Ban 
 Area 
(sq. miles)
Percentage Area 
(sq. miles)
Percentage Area 
(sq. miles)
Percentage 
Kentucky 7,478.89 6.218 0.00 0.000 0 0.000 
Maryland 1,077.92 0.896 1.94 0.180 1.94 0.180 
New York 26,451.75 21.993 4,309.73 16.293 4,309.73 16.293 
Ohio 24,761.36 20.587 43.83 0.177 0 0.000 
Pennsylvania 33,669.29 27.994 76.40 0.227 76.40 0.227 
West Virginia 21,867.91 18.182 12.00 0.055 12.00 0.055 
Virginia 4,966.86 4.130 0.00 0.000 0 0.000 
Total 120,273.98 4,443.90 3.695 4,400.07 3.658 
Table 1: Local Fracking Bans 
The shale plays intersect 7,478.89 square miles of Kentucky 
political subdivisions and 4,966.86 square miles of Virginia political 
subdivisions. No local jurisdiction in either state has banned fracking. 
Devonian Shale Play
Marcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality Inside Shale Plays
Local Voter Enacted Fracking Ban
Local Legislative Fracking Ban
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Ohio’s political subdivisions that intersect the shale plays cover 
24,761.36 square miles of the state.9 No legislative bans have been 
imposed by political subdivisions within Ohio’s shale plays. The 
state’s only legislative ban was imposed by Yellow Springs, a village 
located far outside the shale plays.10 The only legislative activities in 
political subdivisions in the state apart from the Village of Yellow 
Springs are pronouncements by the political subdivisions that fracking 
will not be pursued on public lands. Residents of two cities within 
Ohio’s shale plays voted to amend their city charters to ban fracking 
by wide margins—62.87% to 37.13% in Mansfield11 and 66.37% to 
33.63% in Broadview Heights.12 These margins are even greater than 
the only other voter ban, enacted by the voters of Ferguson 
Township, Pennsylvania, by a margin of 52.17% to 47.83%.13 Despite 
this evidence of significant local opposition to fracking in Ohio, no 
local legislatures within Ohio’s shale plays has enacted a ban  
on fracking. 
 
Figure 2: Ohio Fracking Bans 
 
9. This is 505 of the state’s 942 cities and villages and 783 of the state’s 
1,330 townships. 
10. Yellow Springs, Ohio, Resolution 2011-25 (May 16, 2011). 
11. Mansfield, Ohio, Ordinance 12-178 (Oct. 23, 2012). 
12. Broadview Heights, Ohio, Ordinance 115-12 (Sept. 4, 2012). These two 
cities cover 43.83 square miles. 
13. Ferguson, Pa., 2012 General Election Petition (Aug. 12, 2012). 
Devonian Shale Play
Marcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality Inside Shale Plays
Local Voter Enacted Fracking Ban
Local Legislative Fracking Ban
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
Fracking Bans, Taxation, and Environmental Policy 
1488 
The shale plays cover nearly the whole of West Virginia—
intersecting political subdivisions covering 21,867.91 square miles. 
Only the cities of Morgantown14 and Wellsburg15 enacted legislative 
fracking bans, neither of which is still in force.16 These jurisdictions 
cover only 12 square miles of the state. Thus, fracking has only ever 
been legislatively restricted by political subdivision in a scant 0.055% 
of West Virginia’s shale plays. 
 
Figure 3: West Virginia Fracking Bans 
Maryland has one fracking ban among its political subdivisions 
that intersect the shale plays. These political subdivisions cover 
1,077.92 square miles. Only the 1.94 square mile town of Mountain 
 
14. Morgantown, W. Va., Ordinance § 721 (2011). 
15. Wellsburg, W. Va., Ordinance § 725 (2011). 
16. Wellsburg repealed its ban. Wellsburg, W. Va., Ordinance 2011-7-1 
(Aug. 7, 2011). A local judge held Morgantown’s fracking ban 
preempted by state law. Order at 11, Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. City 
of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411 (Cir. Ct. Monongalia Cnty., Aug. 12, 
2011).  Morgantown officials failed to give notice of appeal in time. Too 
Late for Morgantown’s Fracking Ban, WBOY-12 (Aug 23, 2012, 1:06 
PM), http://www.wboy.com/Global/story.asp?S=15944263. Morgan-
town now limits the areas in which fracking may take place. 
Morgantown, W. Va., Zoning Ordinance § 1355.08(C) (2012). 
For a discussion of the challenge to the Morgantown’s fracking ban, see 
John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption, 
Local Power, and Cooperative Governance, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
995, 1026–31 (2013). 
Devonian Shale Play
Marcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality Inside Shale Plays
Local Legislative Fracking Ban
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Lake Park imposed a legislative ban on fracking.17 Thus, only 0.18% 
of Maryland’s shale plays have been restricted. Yet, the majority of 
Maryland’s shale plays are inside two counties. Maryland’s counties 
differ greatly in their financial characteristics from Maryland’s cities 
and towns. It is therefore worthy of note that the ban covers 13.99% 
of Maryland’s non-county political subdivisions in the shale plays. 
 
Figure 4: Maryland Fracking Bans 
 Pennsylvania’s political subdivisions that intersect the shale plays 
cover 33,669.29 square miles of the state.18 Legislatures in six 
boroughs and the city of Pittsburgh covering a mere 76.40 square 
miles of the shale plays have imposed fracking bans.19 This is only 
0.227% of the area of Pennsylvania’s political subdivisions in the shale 
plays. Five of the six boroughs that have banned fracking are in the 
immediate vicinity of Pittsburgh, a highly localized concentration.20 In 
addition, no new local legislatures in Pennsylvania have imposed 
fracking bans after the passage of Pennsylvania’s Act 13, an act  
17. Mountain Lake Park, Ordinance 2011-01 (March 3, 2011). 
18. This is 1,796 of the state’s 2,572 political subdivisions. 
19. The boroughs are Forest Hills, Emsworth, Baldwin, Harveys Lake, 
Wilkinsburg, and West Homestead. Forest Hills, Pa., Ordinance 1017 
(Oct. 19, 2011); Emsworth, Pa., Ordinances § 161 (2011); Baldwin, 
Pa., Code § 121 (2011); Harveys Lake, Pa., Ordinance 4 (2011); 
Wilkinsburg, Pa., Ordinance 2870 (July 20, 2011); West Homestead, 
Pa., Ordinance 659 (May, 10, 2011).  
20. The other borough, Harveys Lake, covers only 7.3 square miles. 
Devonian Shale Play
Marcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality Inside Shale Plays
Local Legislative Fracking Ban
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providing for additional regulation of fracking as well as the collection 
and distribution of a fracking impact fee, on February 14, 2012.21 The 
only fracking ban imposed in Pennsylvania after Act 13 was imposed 
in the Township of Ferguson—a town apparently just outside the 
shale plays—by the town’s voters, not its legislators.22 
 
Figure 5: Pennsylvania Fracking Bans 
New York has numerous political subdivisions that have imposed 
legislative fracking bans and moratoria. New York’s political 
subdivisions that intersect the shale plays cover 26,451.75 square 
miles. Of those, fracking bans have been imposed by 42 political 
subdivisions covering 1,746.38 square miles and fracking moratoria 
have been imposed by 68 political subdivisions covering 2,563.35 
square miles.23 Thus, 16.293% of New York’s shale plays have been 
restricted by legislative bans and moratoria imposed by political 
subdivisions.24 In addition, several political subdivisions that are just 
 
21. H.B. 1950, Gen. Assemb., Sess. of 2012 (Pa. 2012). Pennsylvania’s Oil 
and Gas Act is codified at 58 P.S. §§ 601.101–601.605 (2010).  
22.  Ferguson, Pa., 2012 General Election Petition (Aug. 6, 2012).  
23. Note that jurisdictions that imposed both a moratoria and a ban are 
counted as a ban jurisdiction only. 
24. For the sake of linguistic simplicity in this Article, the general term 
“fracking bans” includes moratoria. But of the shale plays investigated 
here, only local jurisdictions in New York have imposed moratoria. 
Devonian Shale Play
Marcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality Inside Shale Plays
Local Voter Enacted Fracking Ban
Local Legislative Fracking Ban
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outside EIA’s 2011 map of the shale plays have also imposed fracking 
bans and moratoria.25 
 
Figure 6: New York Fracking Bans 
New York political subdivisions account for a whopping 97.947% 
of the area in which local legislative bans have been imposed in the 
shale plays. The Pittsburgh metropolitan area accounts for another 
1.570% of the area, and all Pennsylvania local legislative bans precede 
the passage of Pennsylvania Act 13 on February 14, 2012. All other 
legislative ban jurisdictions combined constitute only 0.483% of the 
area in which a legislative ban has been imposed in the shale plays. 
II. Local Taxation of Fracking 
Suppose governmental entities tend to maximize revenue by 
preferring policies that increase tax receipts. Revenue maximization 
would render some forms of taxation representative of certain 
interests in that the presence of these forms of taxation would yield 
governmental cultivation and protection of those interests in order to 
maximize revenue. Conversely, a relative absence of taxes that 
represent certain interests in this way would result in lesser 
governmental cultivation and protection of those interests. If this 
were true, revenue maximization behavior by local jurisdictions would 
 
25. Nine political subdivisions just outside the shale plays covering 260.01 
square miles imposed bans and 13 political subdivisions just outside the 
shale plays covering 365.29 square miles imposed moratoria. 
Devonian Shale Play
Marcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality Inside Shale Plays
Local Legislative Fracking Ban
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play a significant but unappreciated role in the fight over fracking. 
There is great variation in local taxation of fracking in the shale 
plays. In most jurisdictions, fracking is representatively taxed through 
either representative property taxes or representative income taxes or 
both. But no New York political subdivisions within the shale plays 
impose representative taxes at all. And when Pennsylvania local 
legislatures imposed fracking bans, fracking had the potential to 
generate only minimal revenue until the passage of Pennsylvania Act 
13 provided localities the opportunity to receive substantial revenue 
from fracking. Accordingly, the absence or presence of representative 
taxation of fracking is highly predictive of whether a local legislature 
will impose a ban on fracking.  
Ohio has two classes of local political subdivisions that may 
exercise the Euclidian zoning power—townships and municipal 
corporations. Municipal corporations with fewer than 5,000 residents 
are villages, and municipal corporations with more than 5,000 
residents are cities.26 Ohio townships, villages, and cities are 
authorized to levy real property taxes without voter approval at a 
rate of up to one percent of assessed valuation.27 Taxable real 
property includes subsurface natural gas.28 Accordingly, an Ohio city, 
village, or township permitting fracking increases local property tax 
revenues, and an Ohio city, village, or township banning fracking 
decreases local property tax revenues. Ohio cities and villages, but not 
Ohio townships, also may levy up to a one percent tax on income that 
includes income from natural gas production and income from natural 
gas industry jobs.29 Accordingly, an Ohio city or village permitting 
fracking also increases local income tax revenues, and an Ohio city or 
village that bans fracking also decreases local income tax revenues. If 
local legislatures maximize revenue, this revenue reality would explain 
the absence of local legislative fracking bans in Ohio’s shale plays 
despite the evident popular opposition to fracking in Ohio. 
Kentucky cities, urban-county governments, and counties exercise 
the zoning power. Kentucky cities and urban-county governments are 
authorized to levy real property taxes at rates up to 0.75%, 1%, or 
 
26. Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 1.  
27. Ohio Const. art. XII, § 2; Ohio Const. art XVIII § 13; Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 5705.02 (LexisNexis 2013); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 5705.07 (LexisNexis 2013). 
28. Ohio Admin. Code 5703-25-11(I) (2010). 
29. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 718.01(C) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2013). 
For a basic list of taxable and non-taxable types of income, see FAQ—
Individuals—Taxable/Nontaxable, Reg’l Income Tax Agency, 
http://www.ritaohio.com/faq?fId=1288 (last visited March 2, 2014). 
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1.5% of assessed valuation depending upon population.30 Kentucky 
counties are authorized to levy real property taxes at rates up to 0.5% 
of assessed valuation.31 Taxable real property in Kentucky includes 
natural gas.32 Accordingly, like their Ohio counterparts, Kentucky 
political subdivisions deciding whether to ban fracking will see either 
increases or decreases on local property tax revenues. Further, a 
substantial portion of Kentucky political subdivisions collect taxes 
deceptively referred to as occupational licenses.33 Three types of taxes 
are collected under this heading—wage, net profit, and gross receipts 
taxes—and each political subdivision imposing these taxes collects one 
or two of these types.34 Five counties and eight cities covering 
1,456.405 square miles intersecting the shale plays impose an 
occupational license regime that taxes both net profits and wages. 
This form of taxation is equivalent to a general tax on income and 
includes both income from natural gas production and wages from 
natural gas industry jobs. These jurisdictions stand in the same shoes 
with respect to the decision whether to permit or ban fracking as 
Ohio cities and villages. Five counties and eight cities covering 
1,574.467 square miles intersecting the shale plays impose an 
occupational license regime that taxes only wages. This form of 
taxation does not cover production income but still reaches additional 
wages from natural gas jobs. Jurisdictions that impose this form of 
occupational license regime taxing only wages have greater motivation 
to permit fracking than Ohio townships but less motivation than Ohio 
cities and villages. The 11 counties and 46 cities intersecting the shale 
plays that do not impose any occupational license regime stand in the 
same shoes as Ohio townships because they receive no revenue either 
from natural gas production apart from property taxes. 
Virginia cities and counties exercise the Euclidian zoning power. 
The Virginia political subdivisions also levy real property taxes on 
natural gas deposits. But Virginia has no legal limitations on local 
property tax rates—limiting the representative impact of these real 
property taxes on natural gas, as discussed in detail below regarding 
the state of New York. Nevertheless, Virginia political subdivisions 
may impose a gross receipts tax on natural gas production as a 
 
30. Ky. Const. § 157. City and urban-county government tax rates are 
further capped to a floating percent of assessed valuation based on 
revenue collected in the preceding year. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
132.010(6) (West 2010 & Supp. 2013); § 132.027 (West 2010). 
31. Ky. Const. § 157. 
32. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 132.820 (West 2010). 
33. 2014 Kentucky Communities Imposing an Occupational Tax, Ky. Soc’y 
of Certified Pub. Accountants, https://www.kycpa.org/Content/ 
Files/OccTax.pdf (last updated Feb. 2014).   
34. Id.  
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business license tax—and all of the political subdivisions with 
producing gas wells in Virginia do so.35 The power of Virginia cities 
and counties to tax a percentage of the gross receipts of natural gas 
production is entirely consistent with the utter absence of local bans 
on fracking in Virginia’s shale plays. 
West Virginia counties, cities, towns, and villages exercise the 
Euclidian zoning power.36 The West Virginia Constitution sets state-
wide maximum property tax rates for four classes of property and the 
West Virginia Code further provides maximum county and municipal 
tax rates on those classes of property.37 Taxable real property includes 
subsurface natural gas.38 And so, just as in Ohio and Kentucky, 
permitting fracking in West Virginia increases local property tax 
 
35. Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3712 (2013); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3712.1 (2013); 
Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3713 (2013); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3713.3 (2013); 
Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3713.4 (2013). Business license taxes on natural 
gas production are collected by Buchanan County, Dickenson County, 
Lee County, the city of Norton, Russell County, Scott County, Tazewell 
County, and Wise County. Buchanan County, Va., Code § 88-29 
(2013); Dickenson County, Va., Coal, Gas, and Oil Severance 
Tax Ordinance § 1 (2012); Lee County, Va., Mineral Severance 
License Tax Ordinance (2012); Norton, Va., Code § 11-53 (2011); 
Tazewell County, Va., Code of Ordinances § 10-112; Wise 
County, Va., Amendment to and Restatement of Wise County 
Coal, Gas and Oil Severance License Tax Ordinance #1-2012 
(effective June 13, 2013). These political subdivisions comprise 3,119.489 
square miles of the 4,966.859 square miles of Virginia political 
subdivisions that intersect the shale plays. There is also a provision of 
the Virginia tax code that permits counties and cities to elect to replace 
real property taxes on natural gas with a gross receipts tax on natural 
gas at rates up to one percent, but no cities or counties have made this 
election. Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3286 (2013). Business license taxes on 
natural gas production are collected alongside rather than in lieu of real 
property taxes on natural gas. 
36. W. Va. Code Ann. § 8A-2-1 (LexisNexis 2012).  
37. W. Va. Const. art. X § 1; Amy Higginbotham, et al., West 
Virginia Property Tax Briefing Paper 5–6 (2009). Class 1 
property is property used exclusively for agriculture, Class 2 property is 
owner-occupied residential property and farmland, Class 3 property is 
other real property outside a municipality, and Class 4 property is other 
real property inside a municipality. W. Va. Const. art. X § 1; West 
Virginia State Auditor, Rates of Levy: State, County, School 
and Municipal 2013 Tax Year 1 (2013). The 2013–2014 county and 
municipal rate limits are: 
  Class 1  Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
County N/A  0.286% 0.572% 0.572% 
Municipality N/A  0.250% N/A 0.500% 
 Id. at 2–3. 
38. See W. Va. Code Ann. § 11-4-9 (LexisNexis 2013). 
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revenue, and banning fracking decreases local property tax revenue. 
West Virginia also imposes a tax on severing natural gas at a rate of 
5% of gross value of which 7.5% is distributed to the county in which 
the natural gas is produced.39 Thus, each West Virginia county 
receives 0.375% of the value of natural gas produced within its 
jurisdiction. For their part, West Virginia municipalities may impose 
business and occupation taxes on gross receipts of natural gas 
producers within their jurisdiction.40 Thus, any West Virginia county 
or municipality banning fracking would forgo substantial revenue. 
That only two cities comprising only 0.055% of West Virginia’s shale 
plays have ever imposed fracking bans is consistent with local 
government revenue maximization in light of these local real property 
taxes, severance taxes, and business and occupation taxes. 
Two counties, one city, and thirteen towns exercise the Euclidian 
zoning power in Maryland’s shale plays.41 Maryland counties must 
impose an income tax at a rate between 1% and 3.2%, and so Garrett 
County and Allegheny County—covering the vast majority of 
Maryland’s shale plays—both collect income taxes.42 On the other 
hand, Maryland’s local property taxes do not include natural gas.43 
Indeed, the city and towns in Maryland’s shale plays that do not 
collect income taxes collect no representative taxes on fracking. It is 
therefore unsurprising that one of these fourteen political subdivisions, 
the town of Mountain Lake Park, banned fracking.44 This ban covers 
13.99% of Maryland’s non-county political subdivisions in the shale 
plays but only 0.180% of all the state’s shale play political 
subdivisions. 
Pennsylvania counties, cities, boroughs, towns, and townships 
exercise the zoning power.45 Each of these political subdivisions levy 
real property taxes, but per a 2002 decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, real property valuations in the state do not include 
 
39. W. Va. Code Ann. § 11-13A-3a (LexisNexis 2013); W. Va. Code 
Ann. § 11-13A-5a (LexisNexis 2013). Another 2.5% of this severance tax 
is distributed to all West Virginia counties and municipalities on the 
basis of population irrespective of the location of natural gas production. 
Id. 
40. W. Va. Code Ann. § 8-13-5 (LexisNexis 2012). 
41. Md. Code Ann., Land Use § 4-101 (Lexis Nexis (2014); Md. Code 
Ann., Land Use § 1-101 (Lexis Nexis 2014). 
42. Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10–103 (LexisNexis 2014); Md. Code 
Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10–106 (LexisNexis 2014). 
43. Calvin Kent et al., Taxation of Natural Gas: A Comparative 
Analysis 38 (2011). 
44. Mountain Lake Park, Va., Ordinance No. 2011-01 (effective Mar. 
3, 2011).   
45. 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 10101 (West 2014).  
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the value of oil and gas resources—and so these jurisdictions receive 
no real property taxes on account of the value of natural gas 
deposits.46 Pennsylvania cities, boroughs, towns, and townships are 
prohibited from imposing a tax on “natural resources . . . in such 
political subdivision[s] or on the preparation or processing thereof for 
use or market, or on any privilege, act or transaction related to the 
business of manufacturing, the production, preparation, or processing 
of . . . natural resources” except for “a local services tax and taxes on 
the occupation, per capita and earned income or net profits of natural 
persons engaged in the above activities.”47 Local services taxes and per 
capita occupation taxes on natural gas workers within a locality may 
be collected only by the locality of employment and may not exceed 
$52 per natural gas worker per year.48 The earned income and net 
profits taxes on natural gas production may be imposed at rates up to 
1%, but the definitions of these taxes limit them to income from 
natural gas worker wages and profits from the provision of natural gas 
personal services and they may only be imposed on residents.49 Thus, 
prior to February 14, 2012, Pennsylvania localities could receive from 
fracking only 1% of the wages of residents employed in the production 
of natural gas and $52 from nonresident natural gas workers and 
received no property tax revenue from fracking. 
Facing this relative dearth of local fracking revenue, the city of 
Pittsburgh, four surrounding boroughs, and the borough of Harveys 
Lake banned fracking, covering 0.227% of Pennsylvania’s shale 
plays.50 But the revenue scenario changed abruptly with the passage 
of Pennsylvania Act 13 on February 14, 2012.51 Act 13 imposed an 
“unconventional gas well fee” of tens of thousands of dollars per year 
on each unconventional natural gas well. Proceeds from this fee above 
 
46. 72 Pa. Stat. Ann, § 5020–201 (West 2013); Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n of 
Pa. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Fayette Cnty., 814 A.2d 180, 184 
(Pa. 2002). 
47. 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6924.301.1(f)(4) (West 2013). 
48. 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6924.311(7) (West 2013); 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6924.311(8) (West 2013). Taxes on workers of amounts more than $10 
must be imposed on a “millage or percentage . . . basis.” 53 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. § 6924.311(7) (West 2013). 
49. 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6924.301.1 (West 2013); 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6924.311(12)(2) (West 2013); 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6913 (West 2013); 
53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6924.501 (West 2013). Pittsburgh may also levy 
up to an additional 0.55% payroll tax. 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6924.303(a) 
(West 2013). 
50. Forest Hills, Pa., Ordinance 1017 (Oct. 19, 2011); Emsworth, Pa., 
Ordinances § 161 (2011); Baldwin, Pa., Code § 121 (2011); Harveys 
Lake, Pa., Ordinance 4 (2011); Wilkinsburg, Pa., Ordinance 2870 (July 
20, 2011); West Homestead, Pa., Ordinance 659 (May, 10, 2011). 
51. H.B. 1950, Gen. Assemb., Sess. of 2012 (Pa. 2012). 
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a statutorily set amount—approximately $17 million in 2014— 
are distributed to the localities in which the wells are located on a per 
well basis.52 And while new local legislatures in New York continue to 
ban fracking, no new local legislature in Pennsylvania has enacted a 
fracking ban since the enactment of Act 13. Since then, Pennsylvania 
has resembled Ohio in that only voters, not legislatures representing 
voters, have imposed a fracking ban. If the provision of per well 
revenue by Act 13 is responsible for the cessation of legislative local 
bans in Pennsylvania and not increases in popular support for 
fracking, then it is likely that more voter bans are to come. 
New York cities, towns, and villages exercise the Euclidian zoning 
power.53 Any city with one million or more inhabitants may impose a 
local income tax, but only the city of New York has sufficient 
inhabitants to levy this tax, and it is outside the shale plays.54 Real 
property assessments in New York include the value of natural gas.55 
But the impact of this inclusion on the exercise of the local zoning 
power is eliminated by New York’s constitution and general laws that 
together permit each city, town, and village to adjust tax rates as 
necessary to raise a statutorily calculated sum each year. The 
constitution implicitly limits city and village property tax rates—not 
town property tax rates—by capping yearly revenue not raised for 
debt service to two percent of the five-year average of the full 
valuation of all taxable real estate within the taxing jurisdiction.56 
Because this constitutional provision permits taxes in excess of two 
percent so long as the excess is allocated to debt service, the 
constitutional cap is practically superfluous because real property tax 
rates sufficiently high enough to reach the cap are politically 
unsustainable.57 
 
52. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2314(d)(1) (2014). This residue is divided such 
that 36% is distributed to counties per well located in the county, 37% 
is distributed to municipalities per well located in the municipality, and 
27% is distributed to municipalities in counties in which wells are 
located based upon a complex formula. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2314(d)(1)–(3) (2014). 
53. New York General City Law § 20.24 (McKinney 2014); New York 
General City Law § 20.25 (McKinney 2014); New York Town Law § 261 
(McKinney 2014); New York Village Law § 7-700 (McKinney 2014). 
54. New York Tax Law § 1301 (McKinney 2014). The city of Yonkers, also 
outside the shale play, has special statutory authority to levy an income 
tax. Yonkers, N.Y., Code § 15-100 (2013); Yonkers, N.Y., Code 
§ 15-116 (2005). 
55. New York Real Property Tax § 594 (McKinney 2014). 
56. N.Y. Const. art. VIII, § 10. 
57. Cities, towns, and villages generally may borrow up to 7% of the five-
year average of the full valuation of all taxable real estate within the 
borrowing political subdivision. N.Y. Const. art. VIII § 4. New York 
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Further, a more stringent statutory cap on the growth of city, 
town, and village real property tax revenue including revenue 
allocated to debt service was enacted in 2011.58 The cap is not 
increased or decreased due to changes in assessed valuations. This 
means that the total value of real property as determined through 
assessments in New York do not really determine the amount of 
revenue that may be collected—the only practical import of these 
assessments is the determination of the relative burden of real 
property taxation as between different real property owners. Thus, 
New York cities, towns, and villages in the shale plays may effectively 
raise from real property taxes the full amount permitted under the 
statutory cap irrespective of any changes in assessed valuation due to 
natural gas. And so the revenue of the local jurisdictions in New York 
that exercise the Euclidian zoning power is effectively insulated from 
the decision whether to ban or permit fracking. 
New York local revenues, however, are not politically insulated 
from the decision whether to ban or permit fracking because there are 
political limits in addition to legal limits on the amount of taxation 
that may be imposed. The political constraints likely result in some 
jurisdictions raising less through real property taxes than is permitted 
under the statutory cap because to raise the full amount would inhibit 
reelection of legislatures setting the amount to be raised. But this 
ultimate political check on raising revenue is a far weaker constraint 
on the exercise of the zoning power than legal checks on raising 
revenue through property taxes such as those in place in Ohio and 
Kentucky. A local legislature that maximizes both revenue and tenure 
sets the amount of revenue at the highest politically supportable 
amount. The addition of valuable real property to be taxed would 
increase the amount of revenue raised at the same rate. Thus, all else 
being equal, an addition to the tax base should increase the politically 
supportable amount that can be raised and a reduction of the tax 
base should likewise decrease the politically supportable amount that 
can be raised. But these marginal increases and decreases may be 
entirely offset by political realities where a ban is politically popular 
because the imposition of the ban may secure to the local legislature 
additional votes that are a sufficient electoral buffer to result in a net 
increase of the politically supportable amount. 
Furthermore, any locality in New York with a politically 
supportable amount of revenue from real property taxes that 
significantly exceeds the statutory cap faces neither a legal nor a 
political revenue reason not to ban fracking. Any reductions in the 
 
City may borrow up to 10% of the average valuation and cities of more 
than 125,000 inhabitants may borrow up to 9% of the average valuation. 
Id. 
58. N.Y. General Municipal Law § 3-c (McKinney 2014). 
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property tax base resulting from a local fracking ban may be offset by 
rate increases without exceeding the politically sustainable amounts. 
And so local legislatures in New York that raise the full amount 
authorized under the statutory cap may secure additional political 
security by banning fracking without any sacrifice in revenue. 
Thus, New York cities, towns, and villages have at best a weak 
political check on revenue that constrains the exercise of the Euclidian 
zoning power and at worst have neither a political nor a legal check. 
Determining whether shale play localities comfortably collect the full 
amount authorized under the statutory cap is outside the scope of this 
Article. Even if the cap were not ever imposed and all New York 
localities were collecting maximum politically supportable amounts, 
the political check that would operate is likely to be weak in the face 
of significant popular opposition to fracking. 
III. Representation Through Taxation 
The foregoing suggests the presence or absence of certain forms of 
taxation influences the exercise of the zoning power by local 
governments. Some forms of taxation evidently represent fracking 
interests because governments prefer policies that increase revenue 
and disdain policies that decrease revenue. Where fracking leads to 
revenue increases for local governments, legislative fracking bans are 
exceedingly scarce. Where fracking does not lead to revenue increases 
by local governments, fracking bans are far more prevalent. These 
data support the hypothesis that private interests may be represented 
through taxation as well as elections. Income taxes would represent 
interests that produce income. Properly limited ad valorem property 
taxes would represent interests that increase the value of real 
property. Sales taxes would represent interests that increase 
transactions in the marketplace. The mix of taxes collected by a 
government would dramatically influence its operation. Two 
metaphors are apt for the role representative taxation may play in 
this democratic republic. Elected officials have both vote-seeking 
leaves and revenue-seeking roots. And so the opinions of electoral 
majorities in the United States provide the sail whilst representative 
taxation offers an important anchor. 
Purely electoral theoretical models of American local, state, and 
federal governments focus on the decision-making of individual elected 
officials, but the underlying tendency of governments to maximize 
revenue is likely an institutional phenomena. An institution tends to 
maximize what the institution measures. A proposal made by an 
individual that happens to be likely to increase the measured quantity 
garners support within the institution even if the proposal is not made 
by an individual who aims to increase the measured quantity. This 
institutional phenomenon may operate within governments that 
measure revenue so long as there are proposals capable of affecting 
the amount of revenue that can be collected. And for private interests 
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to be represented as a result, the amount of revenue that can be 
collected must be dependent on the advancement of private interests. 
Once these conditions are satisfied, a government’s actions are likely 
to deviate from the sum of the interests of individual legislatures 
pursuing political security and advancement by pleasing voters and 
campaign contributors. For example, banning fracking appears at the 
moment politically popular but in local jurisdictions that tax fracking 
this political popularity does not yield the desired local legislation. 
At first blush, this all may seem undemocratic because the carrot 
of revenue must compete with the carrot of votes in guiding elected 
governments in determining policy. But the purpose of elections is to 
insure that in determining policy “the decisive voice w[ill] be that of 
the people.”59 And the people may speak with two voices, as voters 
and as taxpayers. If the private interests represented by taxes 
approximate the public interest, it is perfectly legitimate for the voice 
of the people as taxpayers to trump occasionally the voice of the 
people as voters.  
As the discussion of New York local governments other than the 
cities of New York and Yonkers illustrates, not all governments in the 
United States are likely to be influenced by taxation because some 
local governments may easily collect year after year a statutorily 
capped amount of revenue.60 Local governments that collect no 
representative taxes are a valuable control group for empirical 
research on representative taxation. In these jurisdictions, the people 
speak only as voters. Further empirical research into the differences 
between these local governments and other similarly situated local 
governments that collect representative taxes will either empirically 
support or refute the theory that many governments in the United 
States can be modeled as seeking both votes and revenue. The results 
of this initial investigation into fracking bans makes consideration of 
implications of governmental revenue seeking and representative 
taxation for environmental policy immediately worthwhile. 
IV. Implications for Environmental Policy 
If taxation both influences policy and represents private interests, 
then the composition of government revenues should be considered in 
determining the proper locus of environmental policymaking.  
The environmental policymaking locus determination has two 
distinct dimensions. Horizontally, what policymaking role should be  
59. Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the 
Fall of New York 18 (1974). 
60. The cap on local government revenue in New York is only two years 
old. As outlined above, prior to the cap, there was a weak form of 
representation of private interests through taxation. Local governments 
elsewhere may have not collected representative taxes for even longer. 
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played by legislatures, executives, judges, and agencies? Vertically, 
what policymaking role should be played by the federal government, 
states, and localities? Along each of these dimensions there are two 
appropriate evaluative criteria. First, will the governmental actor 
select the proper balance between environmental protection and other 
concerns? Second, will the governmental entity act rigorously but 
with restraint in achieving the selected balance? And so the choice of 
policymaker involves two analyses for each of the twelve different 
potential horizontal and vertical loci, twenty-four different analyses in 
all. This Article provides comparative policy and taxation data on 
only one of the twelve loci, local legislatures. Rather than broaden the 
scope of this Article’s discussion of implications for environmental 
policy beyond the scope of the data provided, this section will analyze 
only local legislatures, as shown by the bolded text in Table 2. This 
limited discussion will hopefully demonstrate that the theory of 
representative taxation may offer a great deal to the evaluation of the 
twenty-two other environmental policymaking locus analyses as well. 
 
 Legislature Executive Judge Agency 
Federal 
Balance Selection Balance Selection Balance Selection Balance Selection 
Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint 
State  
Balance Selection Balance Selection Balance Selection Balance Selection 
Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint 
Local 
Balance Selection Balance Selection Balance Selection Balance Selection 
Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint 
Table 2: Policymaking Locus Inquiry Matrix 
A. Local Legislative Balance Selection 
Environmental protection is but one of the many competing 
concerns for local legislatures and the people they represent. One way 
to frame the resulting choice is the selection of the point at which 
greater environmental protection is worth less than its cost. This 
abstraction is overly linear and divorced from day-to-day decision-
making processes. The better view is that for each decision maker 
there are sets of decisions in which environmental protection wins out 
against other concerns, and there are sets of decisions in which 
environmental protection loses out. Thus, there is not a point on a 
single line of policy with environmental protection on one side and 
everything else on the other; there is a complex process by which 
greater environmental protection is selected in some instances and less 
environmental protection is selected in other instances. Even in this 
diffuse and nonlinear decision making process, the relative size of the 
sets may be said to represent the selection of the balance between 
concerns over environmental protection and everything else. 
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In every locality the theoretical returns from elections on every 
decision implicating environmental protection concerns constitutes the 
potential direct electoral selection of the locally desired environmental 
protection balance. This is the balance that would be selected if a 
locality were governed as a pure democracy. There are too many local 
governments in the United States to say how many localities exist in 
which the zoning power is always and only exercised by local voters, 
but such a form of local government is apparently exceedingly rare.61 
In a typical locality, day-to-day environmental policy determinations 
are made by elected representatives. The election of representatives 
by members of the community is believed to achieve more efficiently, 
though not perfectly, the selection of a balance that matches the 
theoretical balance that would be selected by direct elections. This, 
then, is the electoral representation of private preferences in the 
determination of environmental policy. Where local government 
revenues are invariable, the results of electoral representation alone on 
policymaking are most evident. 
Local representative taxation through income taxes and limited 
ad valorem property taxes evidently shifts the balance selection away 
from the balance that would be selected by the process of electoral 
representation alone. Where these taxes are collected, the interests of 
fracking represented through local taxation are more often able to 
withstand the forces of electoral representation in the face of electoral 
expressions of local preferences that might otherwise be sufficient to 
result in a local legislative ban of the practice. 
Representative taxation does not necessarily shift the selection of 
the balance between environmental protection and everything else 
away from the theoretical direct election balance. Given the power of 
small but motivated groups to sway generalized electoral outcomes, 
the pure electoral representation outcome might often be farther from 
the theoretical direct electoral outcome than would be the outcome of 
a combined system of both electoral and taxation representation.  
And representative taxation does not necessarily result in less 
environmental protection than pure electoral representation. If local 
legislatures tax environmental benefits directly or indirectly, then the 
phenomena of representative taxation would theoretically increase the 
size of the set of decisions that select greater environmental protection 
over other interests.62 
Local taxation system variance from state to state and locality to 
locality ought to be considered in analyzing the local legislative 
 
61. A few small localities hold town meetings in which the zoning power is 
exercised by direct elections. 
62. There are few, if any, taxes imposed directly on environmental benefits 
in the United States. Some have even proposed environmental detriment 
taxes such as excise taxes on energy consumption or carbon emissions.  
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selection of the balance between environmental protection and 
everything else. 
For example, the presence of local income taxes seems to 
dramatically impact the exercise of the zoning power. Thus, the local 
income tax jurisdictions in Ohio, cities and villages, stand in stark 
relief to those jurisdictions that collect only the limited ad valorem 
property tax, townships, when viewing a general zoning map. 
 
 
Figure 8: Northeast Ohio Income Tax Localities Map  
Alongside Northeast Ohio General Zoning Map63 
The visible differences in permitted residential density and 
permitted uses between the zoning in the Ohio cities and villages on 
the one hand and Ohio townships on the other could be explained as 
a result of differences in the preferences of voters. A model that 
instead points to the differences in local revenue systems offers an 
explanation that assumes less variance in individual preferences. If 
variance in local taxation system plays a role in the variance in local 
legislative outcomes, then prevailing views regarding the degree of 
variance in individual environmental preferences ought to  
be reexamined. 
B. Local Legislative Rigor and Restraint 
Once a local legislature selects a balance between environmental 
protection and everything else, putting that environmental policy into 
practice effectively and efficiently requires both rigor and restraint. 
Rigor ensures that the environmental policy is actually achieved. 
Restraint is required to ensure that other interests are not unduly 
sacrificed in the achievement of the environmental policy.  
 
63. Interested in looking at how we currently are using land in Northeast 
Ohio?, VibrantNEO.org (Mar. 26, 2013), http://vibrantneo.org 
/planning-and-zoning/interested-in-looking-at-how-we-currently-are-
using-land-in-northeast-ohio/.  
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To some degree, electoral representation imbues rigor and restraint 
into the process of local legislative policy implementation. But there 
are significant limits. Generally, future elections offer the only means 
of retrospective evaluation of the work of local legislators. For the 
prospect of future elections to ensure rigor and restraint, not only 
must current local legislators be highly motivated by the prospect of 
future electoral failure, local legislators must also believe that the 
failure to act rigorously yet with restraint to effectively and efficiently 
achieve the policies desired by the electorate has a significant 
probability of impeding reelection. To the extent this is not so or is 
insufficient, electoral representation depends upon the ability of voters 
to prospectively evaluate candidates for local office. That is, voters 
are tasked not only with selecting candidates who will pursue the 
policies desired by the voters, but also candidates whose work will 
likely achieve those policies without undue sacrifice of other important 
interests. This is a tall order because the best indicator of an 
individual’s rigor—passion for desired policies—is too often an 
indicator of an absence of an individual’s restraint stemming from a 
myopic focus on some policies to the exclusion of other interests.  
Whether these limits render electoral representation as a means to 
ensure rigor or restraint insufficient is a matter beyond the scope of 
this Article, but the problem these limits create is evident. Electoral 
representation alone may ensure nothing more than that local 
legislators will either espouse the environmental policy desired by the 
electoral majority while working none too hard to achieve that policy, 
doing only as much is required to gain electoral support, or work hard 
to actually achieve the desired environmental policy yet do so by 
needlessly and unduly sacrificing other important interests. 
Fortunately, representative taxation theoretically may yield rigor 
and restraint in local legislative environmental policy implementation. 
If local legislatures institutionally tend to maximize revenue and 
revenue depends in part on environmental quality, then greater 
environmental protection would tend to be achieved even without the 
presence of individual local legislators who passionately pursue 
environmental protection. And if private interests are represented 
through the generation of revenue, local legislation designed to 
achieve a desired environmental policy may tend to be shaped so as 
not to unnecessarily and unduly harm private interests because 
harming these private interests would result in the loss of revenue. 
Conclusion 
This Article has shown an evident variation in local legislative 
responses to fracking. While there are many possible explanations, 
this Article has offered the theory that in some localities the private 
interests associated with fracking are well-represented by the taxes 
they pay while in other localities they are not. The additional 
representation of the private interests associated with fracking would 
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stem from the institutional tendency of local governments to prefer 
policies that augment variable revenues. In some localities, fracking 
has the potential to increase local revenues and so would have greater 
institutional support while in other localities fracking does not have 
the potential to increase local revenues and so would have less 
institutional support. In this way, taxation may dramatically affect 
the local formulation of environmental policy. For that reason, 
representative taxation should be considered in determining the 
proper locus of environmental policymaking. This Article begins that 
effort by examining its role in one potential decision-making locus. 
This is only a start—representative taxation may play an even 
greater role in our system of government. The theory of representative 
taxation may explain a great deal. Perhaps many Americans do not 
exercise the right to vote because their interests are represented 
sufficiently through the taxes they pay. Perhaps the United States 
runs a large trade deficit because the federal government is prohibited 
from taxing exports but may tax imports and accordingly cultivates 
imports more than exports. Perhaps Americans who greatly distrust 
government live under local and state governments that do not levy 
sufficiently representative taxes to yield high-quality governance. 
These are but a few of the contemporary puzzles to which 
representative taxation may provide the answer. 
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Appendix 
Maryland
Mountain Lake Park Town Ban64
New York 
Albany City Ban65
Alfred Town Moratorium66
Alfred Village Moratorium67
Altamont Village Ban68
Andes Town Moratorium69
Annsville Town Moratorium70
Augusta Town Moratorium71
Ava Town Moratorium72
Avon Town Moratorium73
Barrington Town Moratorium74
 
64. Mountain Lake Park, Md., Ordinance 2011-01 (Mar. 3, 2011). 
65. Albany, N.Y., Code § 375-112-a (2012).  
66. Alfred Town, N.Y., Moratorium on and Prohibition of Gas and 
Petroleum Exploration and Extraction Activities, Underground Storage 
of Natural Gas, and Disposal of Natural Gas or Petroleum Extraction, 
Exploration, and Production Wastes (2011). 
67. Alfred Village, N.Y., Ordinance 2014-03 (2014). 
68. Altamont, N.Y., Code § 355-12(B) (2012). 
69. Andes, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-03 (Jan. 9, 2012). 
70. Annsville, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Feb. 9, 2012). 
71. Augusta, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (July 1, 2011). 
72. Ava, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-02 (Dec. 19, 2011). 
73. Avon, N.Y., Moratorium on and Prohibition of Gas and Petroleum 
Exploration and Extraction Activities Underground Storage of Natural 
Gas and Disposal of Natural Gas or Petroleum Extraction Exploration 
and Production Waste Town Moratorium (Mar. 22, 2012). 
74. Barrington, N.Y., A Local Law Imposing a One-Year Moratorium on 
Drilling for Natural Gas Within the Marcellus or Other Shales (July 13, 
2011). 
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Beacon City Ban75
Benton Town Moratorium76
Bethel Town Ban77
Binghamton City Ban78
Blenheim Town Moratorium79
Brighton Town Moratorium80
Bristol Town Moratorium81
Brookfield Town Moratorium82
Buffalo City Ban83
Caledonia Town Moratorium84
Camillus Town Ban85
Canandaigua City Moratorium86
Caroline Town Moratorium87
Cherry Valley Town Ban88
Chester Town Moratorium89
 
75. Beacon, N.Y., Code § 223-17.2 (2012). 
76. Benton, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Sept. 22, 2012). 
77. Bethel, N.Y., Code § 345 (2012). 
78. Binghamtom, N.Y., Code § 250 (2011). 
79. Blenheim, N.Y., Prohibition Within the Town of Blenheim of Natural 
Gas and Petroleum Exploration and Extraction Activities, Underground 
Storage of Natural Gas, and Disposal of Natural Gas or Petroleum 
Extraction, Exploration, and Production Wastes (2014). 
80. Brighton, N.Y., Hydraulic Fracturing and Related Activities 
Moratorium Local Law (June 8, 2011). 
81. Bristol, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-02 (2013). 
82. Brookfield, N.Y., Resolution No. 80 (Oct. 6, 2012). 
83. Buffalo, N.Y., Code § 228 (2011). 
84. Caledonia, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (June 14, 2012). 
85. Camillus, N.Y., Code § 405(A) (2011). 
86. Canandaigua, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-06 (Aug. 4, 2013). 
87. Caroline, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Mar. 13, 2012). 
88. Cherry Valley, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-03 (2011). 
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Colden Town Moratorium90
Conesus Town Moratorium91
Copake Town Moratorium92
Cortlandville Town Moratorium93
Danby Town Ban94
Danube Town Moratorium95
DeWitt Town Ban96
Dryden Town Ban97
Eaton Town Moratorium98
Elbridge Town Moratorium99
Enfield Town Ban100
Fabius Town Moratorium101
Forestburgh Town Ban102
Freeville  Village Moratorium103
Fulton Town Moratorium104
 
89. Chester, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013). 
90. Colden, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013). 
91. Conesus, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012). 
92. Copake, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Oct. 12, 2012). 
93. Cortlandville, N.Y., Ordinance 2010-04 (Aug. 4, 2010). 
94. Danby, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-03 (2011). 
95. Danube, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (Jan 6, 2013). 
96. DeWitt, N.Y., Code § 114 (2013). 
97. Dryden, N.Y., Zoning Ordinance § 2104 (2011).  
98. Eaton, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Aug. 4, 2012). 
99. Elbridge, N.Y., Resolution 121-10 (Dec. 1, 2010). 
100. Enfield, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013). 
101. Fabis, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013). 
102. Forestburgh, Ordinance 2012-02 (Aug. 28, 2012). 
103. Freeville, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-06 (2011). 
104. Fulton, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Sept. 20, 2012). 
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Geneseo Town Moratorium105
Geneva Town Ban106
Genoa Town Moratorium107
Germantown Town Moratorium108
Gorham Town Moratorium109
Guilderland Town Ban110
Highland Town Ban111
Hopewell Town Moratorium112
Hudson City Ban113
Huron Town Moratorium114
Ithaca Town Ban115
Ithaca City Public Ban116
Jerusalem Town Ban117
Kirkland Town Moratorium118
 
105. Genesco, N.Y., Interim Moratorium on All Natural Gas and Oil 
Activities (2012). 
106. Geneva, N.Y. Code § 165 (2011). 
107. Genoa, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013). 
108. Germantown, N.Y., Moratorium on Natural Gas and/or Petroleum 
Exploration Activities, Natural Gas and/or Petroleum Extraction 
Activities, and/or Natural Gas and/or Petroleum Support Activities 
(2012). 
109. Gorham, N.Y., Ordinance 2010-02 (Dec. 30, 2010). 
110. Guilderland, N.Y., Zoning Law § 280-23 (2012). 
111. Highland, N.Y., Code § 190-27 (2012). 
112. Hopewell, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (June 27, 2012). 
113. Hudson, N.Y., Code § 325 (2013). 
114. Huron, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-06 (2012). 
115. Ithaca Town, N.Y., Code § 270 (2011). 
116. Ithaca City, N.Y., Resolution Prohibiting the Leasing of City of Ithaca-
Owned Land for Hydraulic-fracturing Natural Gas Drilling and 
Extraction (Oct. 13, 2011). 
117. Jerusalem, N.Y., Zoning Law § 160 (2012). 
118. Kirkland, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-06 (2012). 
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LaFayette Town Moratorium119
Lansing Town Moratorium120
Ledyard Town Moratorium121
Lenox Town Moratorium122
Lima Town Moratorium123
Lincoln Town Moratorium124
Little Falls City Moratorium125
Livonia Town Moratorium126
Locke Town Moratorium127
Lumberland Town Ban128
Manchester Town Moratorium129
Manheim Town Moratorium130
Marbletown Town Ban131
Marcellus Town Moratorium132
Marshall Town Moratorium133
Middleburgh Town Moratorium134
 
119. LaFayette, N.Y., Town Board Resolution (Aug. 26, 2013). 
120. Lansing, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-02 (2013). 
121. Ledyard, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Mar. 12, 2012). 
122. Lenox, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012).  
123. Lima, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-02 (July 11, 2013). 
124. Lincoln, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012). 
125. Little Falls, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Mar. 20, 2012). 
126. Livonia, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (Dec. 15, 2011). 
127. Locke, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012). 
128. Lumberland, N.Y., Zoning Law § 10 (2012). 
129. Manchester, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Mar. 20, 2012). 
130. Manheim, N.Y., Resolution No. 23 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
131. Marbletown, N.Y., Code § 129 (2013). 
132. Marcellus, N.Y., Ordinance 2010-02 (2010).  
133. Marshall, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (July 17, 2011). 
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Middlefield Town Ban135
Middlesex Town Moratorium136
Milo Town Moratorium137
Minden Town Moratorium138
Moravia Town Moratorium139
Naples Town Moratorium140
Naples Village Moratorium141
New Lisbon Town Ban142
New Paltz Town Ban143
New Paltz Village Ban144
Newfield Town Moratorium145
Newport Town Moratorium146
Niagara Falls City Ban147
Niles Town Ban148
Niskayuna Town Moratorium149
 
134. Middleburgh, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013). 
135. Middlefield, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (June 14, 2011). 
136. Middlesex, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-03 (Dec. 27, 2011). 
137. Milo, N.Y., Resolution No. 22-11 (May 16, 2011). 
138. Minden, N.Y., Moratorium on Horizontal and Directional Gas Drilling 
and Hydraulic Fracturing (2012). 
139. Moravia, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Feb. 15, 2012). 
140. Naples Town, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-A (Nov. 8, 2012). 
141. Naples Village, N.Y., Moratorium on Horizontal and Directional Gas 
Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing (Oct. 11, 2011). 
142. New Lisbon, N.Y., Protection of Rural Environment Local Law (2011).  
143. New Paltz Town, N.Y., Code § 54 (2012). 
144. New Paltz Village, N.Y., Code § 212 (2013). 
145. Newfield Town, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (June 14, 2012). 
146. Newport, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (July 17, 2011). 
147. Niagara Falls, N.Y., Code § 929 (2012). 
148. Niles, N.Y., Code § 138 (2013). 
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Olive Town Moratorium150
Oneida County Public Ban151
Oneonta City Ban152
Oneonta Town Moratorium153
Onondaga County Public Ban154
Ontario County Public Ban155
Oppenheim Town Moratorium156
Otego Town Moratorium157
Otisco Town Moratorium158
Otsego Town Ban159
Owasco Town Moratorium160
Owego Village Moratorium161
Oxford Village Ban162
Palatine Town Moratorium163
Penfield Town Moratorium164
 
149. Niskayuna, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-10 (2012). 
150. Olive, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012). 
151. Oneida, N.Y., Resolution No. 98 (Apr. 10, 2013). 
152. Oneonta, N.Y., Code § 149 (2011). 
153. Oneonta Town, N.Y., Code § 103 (2014). 
154. Onondaga County, N.Y., Resolution No. 11 (Feb. 2, 2010). 
155. Ontario County, N.Y., Resolution No. 762-2010 (Dec. 17, 2010). 
156. Oppenheim, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-03 (Aug. 3, 2012). 
157. Otego, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (Feb. 2013).  
158. Otisco, N.Y., Ordinance 2010-01 (2010).  
159. Otsego, N.Y., Code § 1.04 (2011). 
160. Owasco, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Mar. 15, 2012). 
161. Owego, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-03 (July 30, 2012). 
162. Oxford, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Feb. 5, 2012). 
163. Palatine, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Apr. 18, 2012). 
164. Penfield, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Nov. 7, 2012). 
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Perinton Town Ban165
Plainfield Town Ban166
Portage Town Moratorium167
Red Hook Town Ban168
Remsen Town Ban169
Rensselaerville Town Moratorium170
Richmond Town Moratorium171
Rochester City Moratorium172
Rochester Town Ban173
Rome City Ban174
Roseboom Town Ban175
Rosendale Town Ban176
Rush Town Moratorium177
Sangerfield Town Moratorium178
Sennett Town Moratorium179
 
165. Perinton, N.Y., Code § 205 (2012). 
166. Plainfield, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (2011). 
167. Portage, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Sept. 19, 2012). 
168. Red Hook, N.Y., Code § 143-11 (2013).  
169. Remsen, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-02 (2011). 
170. Rensselaerville, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-03 (2011) (Nov. 10, 2011). 
171. Richmond, N.Y., Ordinance 2014-01 (Jan. 14, 2014). “There was 
applause from the residents and guests.” Richmond Town Board 
Organizational Meeting 29 (Jan 10, 2012, 7:00 PM) available at 
http://townofrichmond.org/content/Generic/View/55:field=documents;
/content/Documents/File/247.pdf. 
172. Rochester, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-204 (June 19, 2013). 
173. Rochester, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (July 16, 2012). 
174. Rome, N.Y., Code § 80 (2011). 
175. Roseboom, N.Y., Protection of Rural Environment Local Law (2012). 
176. Rosendale, N.Y., Code § 75 (2012). 
177. Rush, N.Y., Zoning Law § 120 (2013). 
178. Sangerfield, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012). 
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Seward Town Moratorium180
Skaneateles Town Ban181
Spafford Town Ban182
South Bristol Town Moratorium183
St. Johnsville Town Moratorium184
St. Johnsville Village Moratorium185
Stafford Town Moratorium186
Starkey Town Moratorium187
Sullivan County Public Ban188
Summerhill Town Ban189
Syracuse City Ban190
Taghkanic Town Moratorium191
Torrey Town Moratorium192
Trenton Town Moratorium193
Trumansburg Village Ban194
 
179. Sennett, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Feb 14, 2012).  
180. Seward, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Sept. 18, 2012). 
181. Skaneateles, N.Y., Zoning Law § 148 (2012).  
182. Spafford, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (2012). 
183. South Bristol, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Jan. 9, 2012). 
184. St. Johnsville Town, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Feb. 27, 2012). 
185. St. Johnsville Village, N.Y., 2012-02 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
186. Stafford, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Oct. 10, 2012). 
187. Starkey, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-06 (Feb. 14, 2012). 
188. Sullivan, N.Y., Resolution No. 148-10 (Mar. 18, 2010). 
189. Summerhill, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012). 
190. Syracuse, N.Y., Code § 27 (2011). 
191. Taghkanic, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-03 (Nov. 10, 2013). 
192. Torrey, N.Y., Moratorium on Directional Drilling and Hydraulic 
Fracturing (Dec. 28, 2011). 
193. Trenton, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012). 
194. Trumansburg, N.Y., Zoning Ordinance § 901 (2012). 
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Tully Town Moratorium195
Tusten Town Ban196
Ulster County Public Ban197
Ulysses Town Ban198
Utica City Ban199
Vienna Town Moratorium200
Vernon Town Moratorium201
Verona Town Moratorium202
Wales Town Moratorium203
Warwick Town Ban204
Waterloo Town Moratorium205
Wawarsing Town Ban206
West Bloomfield Town Moratorium207
West Sparta Town Moratorium208
Westerlo Town Moratorium209
Westmoreland Town Moratorium210
 
195. Tully, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (June 13, 2013). 
196. Tusten, N.Y., Code § 14 (2011). 
197. Ulster, N.Y., Resolution No. 74 (Mar. 22, 2011). 
198. Ulysses, N.Y., Zoning Law § 21 (2011). 
199. Utica, N.Y., Code § 2-29-609 (2013). 
200. Vienna, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-04 (July 11, 2012). 
201. Vernon, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (Sept. 20, 2011). 
202. Verona, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Mar. 7, 2012). 
203. Wales, N.Y., Code § 162 (2011). 
204. Warwick, N.Y., Code § 164 (2013). 
205. Waterloo, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Sept. 5, 2012).  
206. Wawarsing, N.Y., Code § 112 (2012). 
207. West Bloomfield, N.Y., Moratorium Law of 2011 (2011). 
208. West Sparta, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Apr. 2012).  
209. Westerlo, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (2012).  
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Whitesboro Village Moratorium211
Wilson Village Ban212
Woodstock Town Ban213
Yorkshire Town Moratorium214
Ohio 
Broadview Heights City Voter Ban215
Lake Erie State Public Ban216
Hartville Village Public Ban217
Hinckley Township Public Ban218
Mansfield City Voter Ban219
Medina Township Public Ban220
Montville Township Public Ban221
Sharon Township Public Moratorium222
Weathersfield Township Ban223
 
210. Westmoreland, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-03 (2013).  
211. Whitesboro, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (2011). 
212. Wilson, N.Y., Village Board Meeting (July 19, 2012, 7:00 PM) available 
at http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Frack_Actions_ 
WilsonVillageNY.pdf. 
213. Woodstock, N.Y., Code § 260 (2012). 
214. Yorkshire, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Oct. 25, 2012). 
215. Broadview Heights, Ohio, Ordinance 115-12 (Sept. 4, 2012). 
216. Lake Erie, Ohio, Ordinance 2012-10K (July 11, 2012). 
217. Hartville, Ohio, Ordinance 1-11.16 (May 17, 2011). 
218. Hinckley Township, Ohio, Ordinance 112111-01 (Nov. 21, 2011). 
219. Mansfield, Ohio, Code § 1.03(H)(1) (2012). 
220. Medina Township, Ohio, Ordinance to Prohibit Hydrologic Fracking 
(Oct. 13, 2011). 
221. Montville Township, Ohio, Ordinance 021412.01 (Feb. 14, 2012). 
222. Sharon Township, Ohio, Ordinance 11-08-11-3 (Apr. 24, 2012). 
223. Weathersfield Township, Ohio, Ordinance 12-091 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
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Yellow Springs Village Ban224
York Township Public Ban225
Plain Township Public Ban226
Pennsylvania 
Baldwin Borough Ban227
Emsworth Borough Ban228
Ferguson Township Voter Ban229
Forest Hills Borough Ban230
Harveys Lake Borough Ban231
Pittsburgh City Ban232
West Homestead Borough Ban233
Wilkinsburg Borough Ban234
West Virginia 
Morgantown City Ban (overturned)235
Wellsburg City Ban (repealed)236
 
 
224. Yellow Springs, Ohio, Ordinance 2011-25 (May 16, 2011). 
225. York Township, Ohio, Ordinance 11-10-08 (Oct. 27, 2011). 
226. Plain Township, Ohio, Ordinance 11-371 (July 12, 2011). 
227. Baldwin, Pa., Code ch. 121 (effective June, 2011). 
228. Emsworth, Pa., Code ch. 161 (effective Aug. 10, 2011). 
229. Ferguson, Pa., 2012 General Election Petition (Aug. 6, 2012). 
230. Forest Hills, Pa., Ordinance 1017 (Oct. 19, 2011). 
231. Harveys Lake, Pa., Ordinance 4 (2011). 
232. Pittsburgh, Pa., Code ch. 618 (effective Dec. 1, 2010). 
233. West Homestead, Pa., Code ch. 13, pt. 6 (effective May 10, 2011). 
234. Wilkinsburg, Pa., Ordinance 2870 (July 20, 2011). 
235. Morgantown, W. Va., Code pt. 7, ch. 1, art. 721 (July 3, 2012). 
236. Wellsburg City, W. Va., Ordinance 10-13 (2011). 
